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"中国外汇:美元负债累累"
Economics focus
NOt quite so SAFE
Apr 23rd 2009
From The Economist print edition
Is China souring on the dollar?
中国正在讨厌美元吗?
CHINA is America’s largest creditor. Thanks to a policy of piling up foreign-exchange reserves and investing most of them in dollar assets, China’s government bought around one quarter of the net increase in Treasuries over the past two years. But just as Washington needs to sell record amounts of debt to fund its soaring budget deficit and to bail out its banks, there are signs that Beijing’s appetite for American debt may be shrinking.
中国是美国最大的债权人。由于积累外汇贮备以及大量投资美元资产的政策性需要,中国政府在过去的两年内增持的美国国债约占其发行规模的25%。 但是就是当华盛顿需要出售大量负债来支撑其高涨的预算赤字并保护其银行的时候,他们意识到北京对美国负债的兴趣正在缩减。
According to official figures, China’s reserves fell in January and February. Taking the first quarter as a whole they rose by just $8 billion, compared with $154 billion a year earlier. Chinese officials have voiced pointed public worries about the effect of America’s massive fiscal and monetary expansion on the value of China’s dollar holdings. In a high-profile essay, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), recently floated the idea of a global reserve currency. The combination of falling reserves and rising rhetoric has fuelled fears that China is turning its back on the greenback.
根据官方的数据,中国的外汇贮备在一月和两月下降了。与去年早些时候的1540亿美元相比,一季度外汇储备增长合计仅为80亿美元。中国官员已经指出了公众的一些担忧:美国巨大的财政开支以及货币扩张影响到了中国所持美元的价值。在一篇态度鲜明的文章 中,央行行长周小川最近抛出了国际货币贮备的设想。外汇储备的下降及对此的热烈的讨论加剧了人们对中国正在抛售美元的担忧。
Follow the money
Assessing that risk means answering two basic questions. Is China buying fewer foreign assets? And is it diversifying away from the dollar? Few have delved deeper into the murky world of China’s capital flows than Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and his analysis suggests a more complex picture than official statistics portray.
跟着货币走
评估这样的风险是否存在需要回答两个基本的问题。中国现在购买较少的外国资产吗?以及是否中国正在从单一美元转换到使用各种货币作为储备?很少有分析可以 比在纽约的国际关系理事会的Brad Setser更深入到中国资本流量的阴暗世界中。他的分析展现了比官方统计描述更为复杂的状况。
According to the official figures, China’s foreign reserves are $1.95 trillion. But Mr Setser reckons that the true figure is around $2.3 trillion if hidden reserves are included, such as those of the China Investment Corporation (CIC), the country’s sovereign-wealth fund, and the “other foreign assets” of the PBOC. Taking this wider measure of foreign-exchange reserves, and then adjusting for changes in the value of non-dollar reserves caused by swings in the dollar, Mr Setser reckons that China’s total reserves rose by around $40 billion in the first quarter, only one-fifth of their increase in the first quarter of 2008. On the face of it, this represents a big drop in China’s demand for foreign assets.
根据官方的数据,中国的外汇储备是19.5万亿美元。但是Setser认为加上隐藏的贮备比如中国投资公司、国家的主权基金和央行的“其他外汇资产”,真 正的数字应该在23万亿左右。然后计算由于美元浮动带来的非美元资产的价值,Setser先生估计中国总的外汇储备第一季度增长了大约400亿美元,仅是 2008年一季度增长额的四分之一。乍看之下,这描绘了中国对外国资产需求的巨大下降。
But official reserves are not the only potential source of Chinese demand for dollars. To see why, look at the country’s balance of payments. China’s current-account surplus is bigger than it was a year ago. That surplus along with a dollop of foreign direct investment gave China a net inflow of foreign exchange of well over $100 billion in the first quarter. If reserves rose by only $40 billion, then something else must account for the other $60 billion. Despite its strict capital controls, China is experiencing a large outflow of speculative private capital, or “hot money” (see top chart, below), largely that of Chinese investors. Just as such “hot money” inflows last year drove China’s reserves up by more than the current-account surplus, so the outflows have now dampened reserve accumulation. But as long as China runs a large current-account surplus, it must, by definition be accumulating foreign assets. What seems to have changed, of late, is who is buying them. The “hot money” leaving China might still buy American Treasuries, or it could buy something else.
但是官方储备不是中国对美元需求的唯一潜在来源。为什么?瞧瞧这个国家的支付平衡把。中国的经常项目余额大于上一年。经常项目余额加上一块外国的直接投资 在第一季度给予中国的外汇交易超过1000亿美元的净流入增长。如果外汇储备仅仅增长了400亿美元,那一定还有其他因素弥补了剩下的600亿美元。尽管 中国有严格的资本控制,但是中国正在经历投机私人资本的大量流出,或者说是“热钱”(看下面图标的第一张),在很大程度上是中国投资者。正当去年热钱的流 入使得中国外汇储备的提高超过了经常项目余额,因此现在热钱的流出给外汇储备积累拨了凉水。但是只要中国有一个较大的经常项目剩余就必须定义为这是外国资 本的积累。晚些时候似乎改变了的是谁正在买外国资产。正在离开中国的热钱在买美国的国债,或是可能其他的东西。
What of the idea that China’s government has diversified into other currencies? Here, too, the statistics are hard to make sense of. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages the country’s reserves, does not disclose such details. America’s Treasury reports on foreigners’ investments in American securities, but these figures may understate China’s stash because China buys some dollar assets though non-American intermediaries. For instance Mr Setser and his colleague, Arpana Pandy, estimate that since mid-2006, China has accounted for around 30% of purchases of American Treasuries though London. If these flows are added in to Washington’s figures, China has about $1.5 trillion invested in dollar assets, of which about half are in Treasuries. This is about 70% of China’s total reserves. While that is down from over 80% in 2002, the drop largely reflects the weaker dollar, not a shift into other currencies.
中国政府正在考虑用什么方法将储备多样化为其他货币呢?在这里同样很难用官方数据来弄清楚这个问题。掌管这国家外汇储备的外汇管理局并没有透露细节。美国 财政部报告称外国投资主要在美国证券上,但这个数据可能是保守估计了中国的隐藏数据,因为中国还通过非美元的中介购买美元资产。举例来说,Setser先 生和他的同事Arpana Pandy推测从2006年中期开始中国30%的美国国债是通过伦敦购买的。如果这笔资金加到华盛顿的指标之中的话,中国大约有15万亿的美元资产,其中 大约一半是国债。这里是中国外汇储备总和的70%。而这个比例从2002年的超过80%下降(到现在的70%)反应了美元的疲软,而不是转移到其他货币上 去了。
SAFE has spent much of the past few years diversifying the types of dollar assets it holds. During 2007 it bought government-agency debt, ie, that of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than Treasuries. In 2007 and 2008 it started to buy equities, just before the market tumbled. In the year to June 2008, China’s holdings of American shares more than tripled to $100 billion. Before the financial markets collapsed last year, SAFE may have had over 15% of its portfolio in equities and corporate bonds, which is high for an official body—and has left it with huge unrealised losses. It is widely thought that SAFE does not mark to market, so official reserve figures conceal the hit. But it is sure to dwarf the more publicised losses from CIC’s investments in Blackstone, a financial firm, and Morgan Stanley, an investment bank.
外管局花费了过去几年的时间来多样化手中持有的美元货币。在2007年它购买了政府代理负债,比如用范妮梅和弗雷德马克来代替国债。在2007年和 2008年市场崩盘之前外管局开始购买产权。在2008年6月中国持有的股份是1000亿美元的3倍。在去年金融市场崩盘之前,外管局可能超过15%的外 汇储备是持有的产权和公司票据。这个比例对一个官方组织来说是比较高的——并且其中还有巨大的浮亏。人们普遍认为外管局不能影响市场,因此官方外汇储备数 据隐藏了这部分亏损。但是外管局确实因CIC对黑石集团——一家金融公司的投资和摩根斯坦利——一家投资银行的投资而出现了公开的亏损。
By many standards China’s reserve portfolio has held up well during the crisis, because most of its reserves are still in long-term bonds which rose in price as interest rates fell; and the dollar so far has been strong. But embarrassing losses on riskier assets have led to a sharp shift in behaviour. Since mid 2008 SAFE has sold government-agency debt and corporate bonds. Its purchases of Treasury bonds have surged (see bottom chart) but of late they have been almost exclusively short-term bills. According to Mr Setser’s figures, over the past three months China’s American assets showed no growth for the first time in many years—despite the modest increase in reserves.
许多标准的中国外汇储备组合在危机中很安全,因为大多数的这些储备仍然是长期的票据——这些票据在国际利率下降时得到了增值;并且美元在很长时间里会保持 强劲。但是风险资产上令人为难的亏损导致了转移的行为。自2008年中外管局开始出售政府代理负债和公司票据。外管局对美国国债的购买爆发性增长(看图 标)但是后来他们购买的几乎都是短期票据。根据Setser的数据在过去三个月是这些年来首次中国的美国资产没有增长——尽管外汇储备有适度的增长。
What does this all add up to? China is trying to have it both ways. It wants to lessen its dollar exposure, but it also wants to hold down the yuan. The picture has been temporarily clouded by shifts in “hot capital” flows, but so long as China runs a large current-account surplus, its reserves will rise. In order to keep the yuan weak against the dollar, a large chunk of those reserves will end up in greenbacks. Beijing’s appetite may not match Washington’s growing need for cash. But China cannot sour on the dollar without letting its own currency rise.
这一切说明了什么?中国试图同时走两条路。他想减少对美元的依赖,但是他仍然想稳定人民币。局面暂时因转移到“热资本”而蒙上一层阴影,但是只要中国有巨 大的经常项目余额,他的外汇储备就会增加。为了保证人民币对美元的相对贬值,一大部分的外汇储备将会以美元增长。北京的胃口不会符合华盛顿对现金增长的需 要。但是中国不会在增加自货币身风险的情况下去厌恶美元。
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